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In the main, society assigns its moral obligations toward the aged to 
the health care system. This is in large part due to personal and cul-
tural repugnancy manifested by society toward the aged. It is easier to 
burden others with the obligations we all should perform. But medical 
care of the aged is also due to other factors, such as the technological 
success of medicine which leads to an ever-increasing bulge in the 
aging population, the mechanistic and materialistic view of health 
which leads to a view of aging as a biological function of time rather 
than a social condition,l and the availability of health care which 
results in 25% of health care use by 10% of the population which is 
over 65 years of age. 
In view of these factors, it seems a worthwhile task to examine the 
moral and professional obligations of the healing profession toward 
the aged. Such an examination is particularly important given the anti-
aging attitudes and values which press upon members of the healing 
profession, especially in their educational training. 2 
My thesis shall be that professional and moral obligations toward 
the aged stem from human need. To support this thesis I will offer 
three considerations: first, that aging is a social process of greater and 
greater dependency; secondly, that justice requires attention to the 
need created by such dependency, particularly since a large part of the 
dependency is either created by or encouraged by the health care 
system; and finally, that human need provides the moral basis of our 
ethical obligations toward the aged. 
The Social Process of Aging 
One of the most remarkable of human characteristics is an inability 
to see what is obvious. Nowhere is this characteristic more evident 
than in attitudes toward aging. In part this inability arises from fear of 
death. To open-mindedly approach aging is to open-mindedly face our 
own death. Fear, therefore, blurs what is obvious about aging. 
Social attitudes, too, contribute to this blurring. They push us 
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toward repugnancy of aging from a variety of claims which appear 
clear. Is it not clear that the non-productive should yield to those 
younger members of society who are productive? That competition 
for scarce resources should lead to less care for the non-productive? 
That the survival of the species should depend on those who can 
reproduce, not those who cannot? That the physical and psychological 
problems of the aged are best addressed by institutional care? That 
this care should be less personal because it would cost less? 
These attitudes which profess clarity are, in fact, obscurantist. For 
they rest on yet another or third contributing factor to a mispercep-
tion about aging. This factor is the technological encapsulation of 
aging as a pathology. Aging is seen as the incurable disease of living, 
and the aged as the living dead. Thus, the inability of the health care 
professional to cure this "pathology" leads to a profound distress in 
society and an existential A ngst in the midst of personal growth. 
Taken together, these three factors, fear of our own death, social 
attitudes, and the rupture of medical objectives seeking to "cure" 
aging all lead to a misperception about aging. This misperception, in 
turn, skews both social obligations and personal care for the aged. 
Geriatrics is not seen in its proper light, as the discipline which con-
tributes to the mark of a compassionate society by steadfastly clinging 
to respect for persons. Instead, geriatrics is viewed as an aberrant 
dumping ground of do-gooders who refuse to recognize economic, 
social, and cultural realities. 
But what is so obvious about aging, and what can it contribute to a 
discussion of professional and ethical obligations? It is simply this: all 
growth is a social process of dependency in which biological deteriora-
tion is only one factor. 
We are accustomed to view growth and development as a steadily 
increasing independence. Aging, therefore, seems to be a decline. But 
in reality, growth and development take place in an expanding system 
of obligations and dependencies. As toddlers, we trade the depend-
ency of being carried for a greater network of dependency on adults 
to warn us of new dangers, like crossing the street. As youths, we 
trade dependency on family for the new obligations and dependencies 
of raising our own families and contributing to our society. As senior 
citizens we trade our dependencies on the rigamarole of work for new 
obligations to grandchildren , dependencies on the stock market, social 
security, and economic welfare. In short, what we think are free-
doms - for example, the freedom to work - are really larger networks 
of dependency. That is why retirement is so difficult. As we are cut 
off from the network of dependencies, new-found freedoms fre-
quently feel like isolation. 
What is obvious, therefore, is that only death is the great liberator 
from systems of dependency. Growth, development and aging are all 
part of a social reality which requires increased obligations for our 
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freedoms. And these obligations create dependencies. 
In this view, therefore, aging is but one of many stages in life in 
which we move through one system of dependency to another. The 
objective of geriatrics should consequently aid this natural process, 
not inhibit it. While curing disease and healing the person are objec-
tives of the healing profession throughout the lifespan of a patient, 
caring for the whole person should predominate in the later years 
when cure is futile. Of course, care for the whole person is too broad a 
requirement to be specific to health care. All persons share this obliga-
tion throughout the life of those in our charge. Pnbsing an under-
standing of specific health care obligations toward the aged will be the 
task of the following two sections. 
In sum, the reason why society should care for the aged is based 
upon the natural process of growth and development of all persons. 
This process is a synthesis of freedoms, obligations and dependencies. 
Arguments about scarce resources, survival of the species and the like, 
neglect this extremely important network. 
Justice and Need 
The system of dependency, described above , requires justice. Each 
person ought to be treated fairly, that is, provided the basic minimums 
to lead a reasonably independent and responsible life. 3 This has been 
called the moral principle of respect for persons. Some philosophers 
argue that this principle is the fundamental moral principle of human 
life. 4 However, as human need increases, a different rule of justice 
obtains. St. Augustine expressed it as "to each according to his need. " 
Those who need more, or are disenfranchised in some way by greater 
dependency, should receive even greater attention and care. This 
observation about justice will inform the rest of the discussion in this 
section: the greater the need, the greater the obligation to meet it. 
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
recently issued a summary report on the moral principles guiding its 
recommendations to HEW. It is called the Belmont Report.5 In it, the 
National Commission does a superb job of articulating three moral 
principles which can certainly be applied to the obligations of the 
healing profession: the dictum against harming, the principle of 
benevolence, and the matter of justice. I shall briefly examine each. 
First of all, all health professionals share in the famous Hippocratic 
dictum against harming patients. The Belmont Report derives this 
prescription from respect for persons. But I would suggest that its 
immediate derivation stems from the value professed by the health 
profession: healing. It is clearly contradictory for those who profess to 
heal to cause harm. A singleminded attempt to cure the aged of 
specific diseases actually may not benefit the larger view of their life 
and goals. Providing basic nutritional support and care may, in fact, 
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better meet the goal of healing than repeated hospitalizations for a 
downhill course. 
The principle of benevolence directly addresses the needs of the 
aged, a moral obligation to care for persons who cannot care for them-
selves. But this principle, too, can be reached in a consideration of 
healing. If, in fact, health care aims at healing, then the dependencies 
which characterize the aged, especially with regard to health, must be 
addressed. 
Put another way, in a system of dependency, patients need the 
knowledge and skill which the profession possesses. They are lay-
persons in an imbalanced relation to the expert. With respect to the 
aged, many must rely upon health care professionals to meet even 
their ordinary needs. 
Thus a health care professional, in order to approach the value of 
healing, must not only attend to the needs of the patient, but also to 
the imbalanced relationship between expert and layperson. Attention 
to the imbalanced relationship only intensifies one's professional 
obligations when the relationship covers more than clinical indicators, 
but a vast range of human needs to be provided for. 6 
Finally, the principle of justice follows from the previous remarks. 
Creating equity between those with expertise and those without, 
between the providers and those who depend on provisions to meet 
fundamental human needs, is a task of justice infused with compas-
sion. Persons in need are disenfranchised with respect to that need. If 
healing is to occur, even without cure of some diseases, the healing 
profession must right the displacement, the physical dependency and 
emotional anguish, by re-establishing the personhood of the aged. 
It is important to consider how the health care system, so provident 
to the young and middle-aged, has actually contributed by its success 
to the sometimes woeful condition of the aged. By its success, too, we 
are wont to consider health as almost a moral obligation and those 
who fail to achieve it in old age, dismal moral failures. There is a 
matter of justice here. The wrong done to the aged can be righted by 
helping them adjust to the presence of their own life. Provide the 
fullest independence possible within the limitations of the patient's 
abilities. 
Ethical Obligations 
So far, I have sketched how aging is a process of greater and greater 
dependency, and how the needs created by this dependency provide 
the grounds for health professional obligations toward the aged. In 
this final section, I will develop the ethical obligation required of us. 
The distinction between professional and ethical obligations is 
somewhat artificial. There are, of course, distinctions which can be 
drawn between professional obligations found in the AMA code and 
ethical obligations of the nature discussed in the previous section. 
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Thus the basis of the distinction lies in the fact that not all profes-
sional obligations are ethical and not all ethical obligations are pro-
fessional. The purpose of drawing the distinction at this point is 
twofold. First, we must illustrate how ethical analysis of issues in the 
care of the aged cannot rest on a professional code alone, but is 
required by the commitment to care for the aged. Secondly, the obli-
gations mentioned in the previous section are explicitly shown to stem 
not only from general ethical norms such as respect for persons, but 
also from the added commitments of the profession itself. Hence, if 
the following discussion has merit, the health professional's obliga-
tions toward the aged are general ethical obligations intensified by the 
profession to heal. Not only do the obligations rest on general norms, 
but also on specific norms of the profession itself. 
1) Ethical Analysis as Obligation 
Ethics is not a court of last appeal, or even a body of do's and 
don'ts. Instead, it is a discipline of rational discussion about value con-
flicts. Thus, following the codes of professions does not automatically 
yield an ethical decision. Codes provide for certain minimal obliga-
tions of a profession, and a degree of self-regulation. They do not 
necessarily provide for a process of rational discussion about values. 
What does acting ethically mean then? Simply put, it means that 
one has analyzed one's decisions in light of standards of the right and 
the good. 
The decisions to be made about the care of the aged involve one in 
a vast array of value questions and conflicts, not only with individual 
and personal crises, but also with the design and function of systems 
of care. All of these decisions are laced with values and all demand the 
highest order of moral reasoning. 
Ethics for the healing profession is therefore not optional. If a pro-
fessional can be described as one possessing the requisite knowledge 
and skill to care for others, then the knowledge and skill of a health 
professional concerns making right decisions about human beings.7 As 
the health status of the patient constantly changes, so too must the 
decisions. 
If making right decisions about human beings is the task of a health 
professional, then one must ask what is a "right" decision. It can 
mean either a "correct" decision or a "good" decision. A correct deci-
sion would conform to the scientific and practical canons of correct-
ness which the profession espouses. A good decision would embrace 
these canons and other more normative factors.8 It is these other 
factors which require ethical analysis by the health professional. 
Making good decisions for the aging patient is difficult because it 
requires analysis of a value conflict and reasons in support of one or 
another value. 
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If a lonely 88 year old woman in a nursing home decides she wants 
to die by refusing to eat, values immediately come into conflict. Is she 
senile? Is she in fact very sane? Can health professionals not force her 
to eat and participate in her suicide? Is her action really suicidal? In 
order to resolve this and many similar cases, one must identify values, 
such as the right to make independent decisions about our bodies, the 
value of life itself, what is an ordinary and what is an extraordinary 
treatment in this instance, and so on. These values must then be 
ranked and a decision made. Is the woman's right to independent 
decision-making more valuable than the general value of life? 
Identifying, ranking, and prioritizing values in a decision are all 
hallmarks of ethical analysis. 9 
2) Professional Obligations as Specific Ethical Ones 
If, indeed, one cannot be a health practitioner without a require-
ment for ethical analysis, then upon what basis does the requirement 
rest? In the previous section I suggested that it flows from the value of 
healing professed by the health professional and the human need for 
that value possessed by the aged. It remains to develop the normative 
basis for specific ethical obligations toward the aged required of health 
professionals. 
All persons possess obligations of justice toward those in need, 
among whom are the aged. These obligations rest on general moral 
principles such as respect for persons, natural law, or principles of 
utility, the three moral theories most often appealed to by moral 
thinkers. Health professionals, however, profess the value of healing 
and consequently obtain an additional obligation which follows from 
this profession. As the health needs of an aged person increase beyond 
the capacity of families and others to care for them, the intensified 
health professional obligations come into play to meet those needs. 
In the previous section I enumerated three norms of professional 
ethics which help direct the health professional. These are clearly 
needed. One of the most obvious characteristics of general moral prin-
ciples and arguments about their validity is that they remain too 
abstract for immediate application without some additional guidelines 
or norms. Thus one could, equally well, argue from respect for persons 
that the aged women mentioned above should be allowed to die or 
should not.1 0 It is for this reason that Jonsen and Hellegers argue for 
the need for analysis of obligations of justice in medical ethics,11 and 
Arthur Dyck cites the need for what he calls "moral policy," in addi-
tion to the usual analyses of moral principles and their justifica-
tion. 12 Without the development of what Mill calls "intermediate 
principles," general norms fail to be action-guiding. 13 
Add to the abstract nature of general norms the concrete value 
clashes of specific situations surrounding care for the aged, and physi-
cians often find themselves in a difficult moral quandary. Since the 
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value of healing they profess may clash with institutional requirements 
and family values, caring for the aged requires remarkable astuteness 
about what truly heals in this situation and what does not. 
The norms or "intermediate principles," suggested in the second 
section of the paper, serve to guide physicians with respect to all their 
patients, not just the aged. They are enjoined by their profession to 
heal, not to harm patients, to respect the dependency of patients on 
their knowledge and skill, and to treat each patient as a class instance 
of the human race. 14 How are these norms made even more specific 
with respect to the aged? 
Because of the greater dependency of the aged on others as well as 
the knowledge and skill of the health professional, even greater atten-
tion than normal must be paid to not harming the patient. Extensive 
treatment of a urinary tract infection in an extremely old patient 
might, in fact, cure the infection but "harm" the patient in a very 
damaging way, depending on his values. He may wish to end his life 
while relatively independent. To cure the infection may mean yet 
another trip back to a stifling environment. With respect to the second 
norm, the physician must treat the aged with an explicit attention to 
removing the patient's dependency on physicians for their care. This 
action stems not from economic considerations per se, but from heal-
ing obligations. Even a minimum independence from the health care 
system, no matter how slight it may appear to us, can provide some 
possibility for the aged to pursue self-directed personal activities. 
Finally, the third norm of treating each person as a class instance of 
the human race has at least two sequelae specific to the aged. First, 
physicians must address the often shameful treatment of the aged 
poor in situations brought to their attention. Concern for improving 
the health care system for the aged can result from this norm. Second, 
and more concretely, physicians must take care that individuals suffer-
ing chronic brain syndrome and advanced aging processes secondary to 
social causes like poverty and its consequent poor nutrition, or per-
sonal causes like alcoholism or smoking, are given the same standard 
of care and compassion as others without these causes. To treat each 
person as a singular human being is not an obligation of charity as it 
well might be for the general popUlation. Instead, it stems from the 
profession to heal and is one of the great moral guidelines in the proud 
history of medicine. 
In sum, then, I have argued that following professional codes does 
not automatically lead to ethical decision-making. Because members 
of the healing profession make a commitment to care for human 
beings, and these persons are in a state of need which only expert 
advice and care can rectify, a professional decision demands ethical 
analysis of values. Such an analysis engages professionals in a process 
of self reflection and critique of action, something a code of ethics 
does not provide. 
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Furthermore, care for the aged requires a commitment to healing 
which, at the very least, attempts to reduce some of the physical 
dependency on the experts by providing the maximum level of inde-
pendent action and decision permitted by the condition of the 
patient. This requirement does not stem, as I have argued, from 
external standards of society. In fact, it seems often to be at odds with 
the commonly accepted attitudes toward the aged. Instead, the 
requirement to heal is given its moral force by the profession of its 
value. Healing is a fundamental human need, and therefore, a funda-
mental human value. 
Acting on the needs of the aged is not so much an intellectual 
acknowledgement of the moral principle of respect for persons. 
Instead it puts this principle into action in day-to-day decisions. Meet-
ing the requirements of the aged is not so much a cultural need as it is 
an act of compassion urged on us by the very nature of the healing 
profession. 
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